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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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>
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vs.
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal
corporation,
Defendant and
Petitioner.

]

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Pursuant
Supreme

Courtf

to
the

Rule

45(3) of the Rules of the Utah

Defendant-Petitioner

(hereinafter

the

"City") asserts that the Utah Court of Appeals departed so far
from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as
to call for an exercise of this Court's power of supervision.
Plaintiff-Respondent

(hereinafter the "Company") asserts that

such assertion is without merit.
The

City

asserts

the

following

grounds

for

its

Petition:
1.
in

Did the Court fail to give equity to the City

solving

one

widow's

financial

problem

by

reconstructing the contracts between the parties to
shift the burden of such financial obligation from her
to the Defendant City's ratepayers, contrary to the

agreement and the 64-year course of the dealing of the
parties.
2.
of

Did the Court err in asserting that the owners

stock

in

the

Plaintiff

were

immune

from

the

requirements of paragraph IV and L of the agreement of
1965.
3.
in

the

Did the Court fail to decide the ambiguities
contracts

against

the

Plaintiff

and

give

consideration to estoppel and laches which should have
applied in this case.
The Company asserts in response:
a.

None

of

the

Courts

"solved"

one

widow's

financial problems, but declaratory relief was sought
and obtained as to the respective rights of the City
and of the Company.
b.
1965

The provisions of paragraph IV and L of the

Agreement

apply

to

"private

lines" owned

by

"private parties" and not to the "Company system."
c.

There are no ambiguities in the contracts and

any resort to estoppel and laches are without merit.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Rule 43(3) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court
provides for certiorari if the Court of Appeals has rendered a
decision which has so far departed from the accepted and usual
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course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of
this Court's power of supervision.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The District
interpreting

the

Court

rendered

two Agreements

a Declaratory Judgment

between

the parties dated

January 2, 1920 and July 27, 1965 in favor of the City.

The

Company appealed the District Court Judgment.
The

Court

of Appeals

held

that

the City

had the

responsibility of maintaining the entire Company system.

The

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, filed August 12, 1987, is
attached as part of the appendix.

The City filed a Petition

for Certiorari.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Contrary

to

the

assertions

of

the

City

in

its

Petition, the facts have been misstated and it is necessary
therefore to properly state the facts.
1.

Salt

Lake

City

Corporation

is

a

municipal

corporation of the first class of the State of Utah.
2.

Big Cottonwood

Tanner

Ditch

Company

is a Utah

corporation serving its stockholders culinary and irrigation
water.
3.

In 1920, an Agreement was entered into between the

Company and the City wherein:

-3-

a.

The City agreed to maintain only the "Mains"

(paragraph 11).
b.

The City was to furnish certain grades and

quantity of pipe to the Company for the Company to
install

from

the

"Mains"

to

its

stockholders

(paragraphs 7 and 8).
c.

The

maintenance
system

Company
of

except

shall

'hydrants
that

part

be
and

responsible
other

thereof

parts
defined

for
of
as

the
said
the

"Mains"1 (paragraph 10).
d.

The Company would furnish to the City certain

water (paragraph 1).
e.

The

City

was

in turn

to

furnish

a lesser

amount of culinary water to the Company, and certain
amounts of irrigation water to the Company (paragraphs
3, 5 and 6).
f.

The City was to construct part of the system

from the "Mains" to the property lines of each owner
together with shut-off valves (paragraph 9).
g.

There is a forfeiture provision in the event

the City fails to perform and the Company is entitled
to "retake . . . the said water . . .

as if this

contract had not been made" (paragraph 13).
4.

There arose a dispute between the Company and the

City as to performance and a lawsuit was filed by the Company
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against the City, Civil No. 105968.

This lawsuit was settled

by entering into the 1965 Agreement.
5.

The 1965 Agreement provides in pertinent part:
a.

The City is to install a booster pump, divert

additional water to the Company, remove a regulator,
install a by-pass regulator, and install a four-inch
system valve on Fardown Ave. (paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and
4).
b.

The City, at the Company's expense, was to

complete certain improvements and water lines (page 2,
paragraphs (a) through (g)).
c.

The City was to

insure unrestricted flow and

unhampered pressure even of if the City used master
meters (page 2, paragraph I).
d.

To maintain and operate at its own cost and

expense all of the Company system (page 3, paragraph
III) .
e.

To

take

over

with

consent

of

the

private

owners, their private lines (not the Company system).
The City

will maintain

the private

lines upon an

agreement with the private parties (not the Company)
(page 3, paragraph IV).
f.

The Company agreed to give to the City a list

of the Company stockholders and to update that list
from time to time (page 3, paragraph 1).
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g.

For

stockholders

purposes
of

the

of

billing

Companyf

the

the

City

individual
shall

read

semi-annually meter readings at the point of use of
the respective individual users (page 4, paragraph E).
h.

The

reasonable

City
repair

shall
of

have

private

the

right

lines

and

to

require

individual

service lines and bill the private owners therefor
(page 5, paragraph L ) .
6.

The 1920 Agreement is ratified, affirmed and in

full force and effect except as specifically changed, modified
or amended in the 1965 Agreement.
7.

The District Court made no findings of facts but

held on May 1, 1984 that based upon the Agreements as a whole,
the City was responsible for maintaining the "mains" only.
8.

The Court of Appeals on August 12, 1987 reversed

the District Court.
9.

A Petition for Rehearing was filed with the Court

of Appeals August 24, 1987.
10.

The Petition for Rehearing was denied October 13,

1987.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT WHICH ESTABLISHED
THE RIGHTS OF THE CITY AND THE COMPANY IS
APPROPRIATE
The Companyf

in 1920f sought to obtain culinary and

domestic water for its purpose and use by its stockholders. To
this endf it established a "Company System."

The City was to

deliver water to the Company:
Provided, that said water . . . be delivered
upon the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch System
as at present constructed, and in such way
and manner and in such quantities, that each
stockholder or user on the system shall be
enabled under the distribution of said water
to which he is entitled or to which he may
be entitled by virtue of his shares or
proportion in the Company or ditch system
and under the system of distribution of said
irrigation water whether distributed by the
rotation system or otherwise
(page 3,
paragraph 3 of 1920 Agreement) (emphasis
supplied).
again at paragraph 4 of the 1920 Agreement:
The City shall properly construct and
perpetually and properly maintain a system
of water pipes of such size, quality,
capacity and kind, (and so proportioned as
to size and manner of construction as to
accord with the accepted standards of
engineering) that will efficiently carry,
regulate, and distribute the water over the
area served by the Big Cottonwood Tanner
Ditch
Company's
System
for
culinary,
domestic or other use ai herein provided
(emphasis supplied).
At paragraph 5 of the 1920 Agreement:
Said "culinary water" shall be furnished and
delivered through said pipe line system in a
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continuous flow during the time and in the
quantity herein stated. The said culinary
water to be furnished and delivered through
said Pipe line or system is that reserved to
the Company out of its proportion of said
Big
Cottonwood
Creek
.
.
.(emphasis
supplied).
At paragraph 6 of the 1920 Agreement:
In the event that during any interval or
period of time, the Company shall not
require through said pipe line or water
system the use of the total quantity of"
water herein reserved and provided for
culinary use, (it being understood by both
parties that the pipe line shall be so
constructed
and
maintained
that
the
community growth and development will not be
hindered, delayed or jeopardized (emphasis
supplied).
At paragraph 7 of the 1920 Agreement:
That in addition to the pipe line agreed to
be constructed and maintained as herein set
forth, the City shall furnish to the Company
galvanized iron pipe in sizes from one to
two inches in diameter as the necessity of
the
case
may
require,
sufficient
to
construct such lines and convey the water
from the part of the system hereinafter
defined as the "Mains" to the property line
nearest the street of all persons upon the
system of the Company whose property cfoes
not abut on the streets along which the
"Mains" are to be laid (emphasis supplied).
Paragraph 10 of the 1920 Agreement provides:
After
installation,
the
Company
shall
maintain said hydrants and other parts ol
said system except that part thereof defined
as the "Mains" (emphasis supplied).
It is apparent that the 1920 Agreement made only two
distinctions.

They are:
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MAINS, as defined by specified location in
paragraph 20.
and,
The Company Systemf
meaning all lines
including Mains, which delivered water to
the Company stockholders.
It is clear under the 1920 Agreement that the Company
is responsible for the maintenance of all lines known as the
"Company System" other than the Mains.
Both

the

City

and

the Company

growth in the area served by the Company.
the 1920 Agreement.
"constructed

and

anticipated

further

See paragraph 6 of

If the pipe line or system was to be

maintained

that

the

community

growth

and

development will not be hindered, delayed or jeopardized" they
must have contemplated "private parties," i.e. other than the
City or the Company, to grow and develop water lines.
By 1965, there were many "private parties" who were on
"private lines," i.e. outside of the "Mains" and the "Company
System."

They are provided for in the 1965 Agreement under the

provisions found in paragraph IV which provides:
To take over, with the consent of the
private owners, and maintain and operate
such private lines, as may be standard water
lines of asbestos, cement or cast iron.
Small galvanized lines that may require
increase in size or may, in the opinion of
the City, be defective will be taken over
and maintained by the City only upon special
agreement with the private parties involved
and with equitable contribution from such
private parties.
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After the private lines have been taken over by the Cityf they
then become "Company Lines" as provided in paragraph "A" as
follows:
When operation and maintenance of private
lines have been pursued by the City as
provided under paragraph IV, such lines
shall thereafter be construed as Company
lines.
Paragraph F however restricts the City, by the following:
City shall be allowed to serve water users
within the area serviced by Company other
than stockholders only to the extent that
such use shall not adversely affect the
pressure
and
volume
of
service
to
stockholders.
It is understood that City
may enlarge the water lines to increase
capacity of the same (emphasis supplied).
If the City supplied water to other private users in
the area who did not become part of the "Company System" as
provided in paragraphs IV and A, then paragraph L comes into
focus. Paragraph L provides:
The City shall have the right to require any
reasonable repair of private lines, and
individual service lines and in the event of
failure to comply with such requirement upon
reasonable notice, City shall have the right
to make such repairs and bill the private
owners therefor and shall have the right of
shut off to enforce collection of such
expense so incurred.
The City attempts to create a new classification of lines, i.e.
"individual service lines" and argues that this can only mean
the lines provided in the 1920 Agreement from the "Mains" to
the "stockholders1 property line."
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This is unsubstantiated by

the Agreements and is without merit.
lines"

are

the

private

lines

of

The "individual service
individuals

who

are not

stockholders and who have not entered into an agreement with
the City under paragraph IV.
The Court of Appeals examined with care, both the 1920
and

the

1965

contentions

of

Agreements,

in

the

addressed

Company

trying

to
in

respond

to

its appeal.

the
The

Appeals Court stated:
The Company contends that the 1965
agreement requires the City to maintain and
operate, at its own cost, the entire
pipeline system, not just the mains. The
City interprets the two agreements to give
it responsibility for maintaining the mains
only,
requiring
the
Company
or
its
individual
shareholders
to
repair
the
service lines.
We must determine what parts of the
pipeline system are mains, what parts are
service
lines,
and
which
party
has
responsibility for maintenance and repair of
each of these parts of the system.
The Appeals Court started its inquiry by:
Where questions arise in the interpretation
of an agreement, the first source of inquiry
is within the document itself. It should be
looked at in its entirety and in accordance
with its purpose. All of its parts should
be given effect insofar as that is possible
(citations omitted).
The City asserts that there is an ambiguity simply
because the parties are not in harmony.
every lawsuit creates an ambiguity.

Under that criteria,

Only when an ambiguity

truly exists can "secondary sources" be utilized to interpret
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the ambiguity.

No one disagrees with the part of the decision

wherein the Appeals Court declared:
Although there was some clumsy phrasing
within the document [the 1920 Agreement], it
is apparent, viewing the agreement as a
whole, that the City was to maintain and
repair the mains, as defined in paragraph
20, and the Company had the responsibility
to maintain the rest of the system.
The plain

language

of

the

1965 Agreement, which

expressly

modified the 1920 Agreement, is:
The City Agrees Further: . . .
to
maintain and operate at its own cost and
expense all of the company system, including
the
reading
of
individual
meters
semi-annually on or about April 1st and
October 1st and the issuing of statements
and collection of the amounts due from
individual stockholders of the Company in
accordance with their rights as determined
by their stock ownership.
All of the Company System means all.

It doesn't mean that some

stockholders have to agree under the guise of a "private line"
to agree with the City under paragraph IV as asserted by the
City.

Those lines are already "Company Lines" as defined by

All of the Company System in paragraphs III and A.
The only way the 1965 contract can be read, in light
of the 1920 contract, is that private parties are going to be
served water and they may become part of the "Company System"
under IV and A and when they do, then the City is responsible
for maintenance.

If they elect not to become part of the

"Company Lines" as defined in IV and A, then paragraph L is
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operative.

But there can be no doubt that THE CITYr EXPRESSLY

CONTRACTED TO MAINTAIN AND OPERATE AT ITS OWN COST AND EXPENSE
ALL OF THE COMPANY SYSTEM.
It

is

axiomatic

contracts, should
provisions.

that

a

be interpreted

contract,

or

series

of

to harmonize all of their

This Court has frequently declared such a rule of

contract construction.

The Appeals Court followed just such

mandate.
The City
consider
reviews

asserts that

the Agreements
both

provisions.

Agreements
If

the Appeals Court

as a whole.
and

the City

gives

The
reason

only maintains

failed to

opinion

clearly

to

of

the

Company must maintain the "rest of the system."

all

the

"Mains," the
The Appeals

Court was absolutely correct in reaching its decision based
upon

the

language

of

both

Agreements

and

appropriately

concluded that:
The City Agrees Further: . . .
to
maintain and operate at its own cost and
expense all of the Company system . . .
is an express change and modification of the 1920 Agreement.
The City argues that since there is no definition of
the "Company's System" as contained in paragraph III, that the
very express language of paragraph III is not a change from the
1920 Agreement.

The City ignores the real context.

First, in

the 1920 Agreement, it was only necessary to define the "Mains"
because that was the only part of the "Company System" the City
was obligated to maintain.
-13-

Under

the 1965 Agreementf

it was not necessary to

define the "Company's System" because it included "all of the
Company's System" even the Mains and the other lines which were
part of the distribution system which were not Mains.

It

included the meters and even meters yet to be installed by the
Company

under

the

paragraph K ) .

Company's

rules

and

regulations

(see

The City stretches credulity to the limit by

such an unmeritorious argument.

POINT II
PARAGRAPHS IV AND L OF THE 1965 AGREEMENT
APPLY TO "PRIVATE OWNERS" NOT TO THE COMPANY
SYSTEM
Paragraph

IV

of

the

1965

Agreement

provides

in

pertinent part:
To take over, with the consent of the
private owners, and maintain and operate
such private lines as may be standard water
lines of asbestos, cement or cast iron.
Paragraph L states in part:
The City shall have the right to require any
reasonable repair of private lines, . . .
By the very

express

terms of both

the

1920 and the 1965

Agreements, other private owners were going to be added by
growth and development

(paragraph 6, 1920 Agreement) and the

City was allowed to serve water users other than stockholders
under

paragraph

F of the

1965 Agreement.

These

"private

owners" of "private lines" may or may not elect to become part
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of the "Company Lines" under paragraph A.

Paragraph A of the

1965 Agreement provides:
When operation and maintenance of private
lines have been pursued by the City as
provided under paragraph IVf such lines
shall thereafter be construed as Company
lines.
If a private owner of a private line does not enter
into a contract with the City as specifically provided in
paragraph IVf then:
a.

The

City

can

still

furnish

water

to them

subject to the limitation of paragraph F:
City shall be allowed to serve water
users within the area serviced by
Company other than stockholders only to
the extent that such use shall not
adversely affect the pressure and
volume of service to stockholders. It
is understood that City may enlarge the
water lines to increase capacity of the
same.
b.

And in the event the private line needs to be

repaired, then the City may invoke its sanction of
cutting off the water to compel the "private owner" of
the "private line" to repair the same.

POINT III
THE CONTRACTS ARE CONSISTENT WHEN READ AS A
WHOLE
The Appeals Court adopted the appropriate standard of
contract construction.

At page 5 of the Opinion, the Appeals

Court stated:
-15-

This would be consistent with what appears
to be the overall intent of the two
agreements:
that the City have total
control and responsibility for the delivery
system of culinary water to all of the users
in the Company area. The concern the City
hasf as previously noted, is to assure
correct water use measurement and to prevent
the waste of water through any defect in the
system prior to that water going through the
meters, at which point the owners would then
be paying for the water and the City would
no longer have any concern. That the City
intended to take over total control is
apparent from the conditions in the 1965
agreement in which it agreed to deliver the
water, to meter it, take over ownership of
the meters, bill the users and collect from
them.
In essence this was the City's
business: to provide, deliver and sell water
to the users (citations omitted).
CONCLUSION
This Court must deny the Petition for Certiorari since
there is a complete lack of showing of any departure from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceeding upon which
this Court should exercise its power of supervision.

DATED this / y

day of November, 1987.
JARpiNE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN

'^
for PlaintiffRespondent
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of
the foregoing RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
were mailed by United States mail, postage prepaid, on this /_*
day of November, 1987, and addressed to the following:
Ray L. Montgomery
Assistant City Attorney
324 South State Street, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, Utah~Jt4111
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOOO
Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch
Company, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

OPINION
(For Publication)

v.
Salt Lake City,
a municipal corporation,

Case No, 860045-CA

Defendant and Respondent.
Before Judges Billings, Garff and Jackson

FILED
AUG121987

GARFF, J u d g e :

Timothy M. Shea
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals

This is an appeal by Big Cdttonwood Tanner Ditch Company
(Company) from a declaratory judgment granted in favor of Salt
Lake City (City) interpreting two agreements. The trial court
found the City responsible for maintenance of the "mains", and
the Company responsible for maintenance of the individual
service lines and private lines from main to meter.
On January 2, 1920, the Company and the City entered into
an agreement to exchange culinary and irrigation water and to
provide for a pipeline system to distribute the culinary
water. The agreement purported, among other things, to
delineate responsibility for the maintenance and repair of the
pipeline system between the parties. Several years later,
disputes arose regarding these responsibilities. The Company
filed a complaint against the City, resulting in the execution
of a settlement agreement on July 27, 1965. This settlement
agreement attempted to clarify the parties' respective
responsibilities, and expressly "ratified, affirmed and
declared to be in full force and effect- the 1920 agreement
except as it was -specifically changed, modified or amended by
the express terms of this agreement.Under these agreements, the pipeline system consisted of
three basic parts: 1) main lines (mains); 2) service lines and
individual service lines extending from mains to meters located
on the property lines of both Company shareholders and private
non-shareholder owners; and 3) lines extending from meters to
water users' homes.

On January 26, 1983, the City notified Mrs. Turpin, a
Company shareholder, that she must pay the cost of repairs for
her service line or the City would shut off her water pursuant
to paragraph L of the 1965 agreement. She refused to pay, the
City shut off her water, and the present action arose.
The Company contends that the 1965 agreement requires the
City to maintain and operate, at its own cost, the entire
pipeline system, not just the mains. The City interprets the
two agreements to give it responsibility for maintaining the
mains only, requiring the Company or its individual
shareholders to repair the service lines.
We must determine what parts of the pipeline system are
mains, what parts are service lines, and which party has
responsibility for maintenance and repair of each of these
parts of the system.
Since the w [interpretation of a written contract is
ordinarily a question of law, • • • this Court need not defer
to the trial court's construction, (citation omitted) but will
make its own independent interpretation of the contract
terms.- Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1980). See
also Bradshaw v. Burninoham, 671 P.2d 196, 198 (Utah 1983). We
consider both agreements in determining the intent and
obligations of the parties. *[W]here two or more instruments
are executed by the same parties contemporaneously, or at
different times in the course of the same transaction, and
concern the same subject matter, they will be read and
construed together so far as determining the respective rights
and interests of the parties . . . ." Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v.
Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 501 P.2d 266, 271 (Utah 1972).
Where questions arise in the interpretation of an
agreement, the first source of inquiry is within the document
itself. It should be looked at in its entirety and in
accordance with its purpose. All of its parts should be given
effect insofar as that is possible. Larrabee v. Royal Dairy
Products Co., 614 P.2d 160, 163 (Utah 1980).
The 1920 agreement provided, among other things, that
"[tlhe City shall properly construct and perpetually and
properly maintain a system of water pipes" to distribute the
water over the area served by the Company*s system for culinary
uses. It specifically provided that pipes would be maintained
in such a manner that there would be no loss or waste of
water. The pipelines would be located and maintained "on the
streets, avenues, lanes or places herein designated and for the
distances herein set forth.* Paragraph 20 of the agreement
specifically stated that, Ma]11 of the pipes of the system to
be laid in or on any of the streets, alleys or avenues, in this

860045-CA
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paragraph described and referred to is [sic] and shall be
understood to be the 'Mains* as referred to in this
agreement." The paragraph goes on to specifically describe
exactly where the mains would run and what streets, avenues,
and alleys would carry the mains. Thus, the agreement was very
explicit in describing exactly which pipes were the mains.
The 1920 agreement also clearly indicated that the
parties intended the City to maintain the mains, and the
Company to own and maintain a system. The agreement provided
that the City would furnish and lay service pipes from the
mains to the property line of each owner on the streets, alleys
and other places where the mains were located. The City was
also to provide galvanized pipe to the Company, "sufficient
[for the Company] to construct such lines and convey the water
from the part of the system hereinafter defined as the •Mains'
to the property line nearest the street of all persons upon the
system of the Company whose property does not abut on the
streets on which the 'Mains' are to be laid." Paragraph 11 of
the 1920 agreement stated, "[t]he City shall be responsible for
the proper maintenance of all that part of the pipeline system
herein referred to as the 'Mains' . . . ." Paragraph 10
provided that the City would install street hydrants, to be
furnished by the Company, and after installation the Company
"shall maintain said hydrants and*other parts of said system
except that part thereof defined as the 'Mains'." Although
there was some clumsy phrasing within the document, it is
apparent, viewing the agreement as a whole, that the City was
to maintain and repair the mains, as defined in paragraph 20,
and the Comoany had the responsibility to maintain the rest of
the system. JThe question now becomes whether or not the 1965
agreement modified, in express terms, any of the conditions or
provisions of the 1920 agreement. Paragraph III states that
the City has the responsibility "[tjo maintain and operate, at
its own cost and expense all of the Company system, including
the reading of individual meters semi-annually . . . and the
issuing of statements and collection of the amounts due from
individual stockholders of the Company . r . ." Clearly, this
1. "In the interpretation of a contract the whole agreement
must be considered, and the whole object is not to determine
what the parties meant to say, but the meaning of what they did
say. (citations omitted) Provisions which are apparently
conflicting are to be reconciled and harmonized, if possible, by
reasonable interpretation so that the entire agreement can be
given effect." Exxon Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 589 S.W.2d
473, 478 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) rev'd on other grounds, 608
S.W.2d 208 (Tex. 1980)..
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is a modification of the 1920 agreement, since, in addition to
the mains, the City has agreed to maintain and operate the
Company system.
It is significant that this agreement concerns three
different types of water users: Company shareholders, private
owners who agree with the City that the City will maintain and
operate their private service lines running from the mains to
the meters in return for equitable contribution, and private
owners who own service lines connecting to the mains but do not
enter into an operation and maintenance agreement with the City.
Paragraph IV of the agreement requires the City "[t]o
take over, with the consent of the private owners, and maintain
and operate such private lines . . . only upon special
agreement with the private parties involved and with equitable
contribution from such private parties." Paragraph A states,
M
[w]hen operation and maintenance of private lines have been
pursued by the City as provided under paragraph IV such lines
shall thereafter be construed as Company lines.- (emphasis
added) Thus, the City agreed not only to operate and maintain
the service lines leading to shareholders' property, but also
the service lines (private lines) belonging to private owners
who had entered into an agreement with the City.
»

Paragraph L then provides that,
*[t]he City shall have the right to
require any reasonable repair of private
lines, and individual service lines and in
the event of failure to comply with such
requirement upon reasonable notice, City
shall have the right to make such repairs
and bill the private owners therefor and
shall have the right to shut off to
enforce collection of such expense so
incurred.H (emphasis added)
If this paragraph is interpreted to apply to service lines of
all property owners, then it is repugnant to paragraph III,
wherein the City had previously agreed to maintain and operate
all of the Company system. However, if it is interpreted to
only pertain to those private service lines with respect to
which the owners have not entered into an agreement with the
City, and, therefore, would not be part of the Company system,
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•then there is no such ambiguity.2 The City would then have the
ability to operate, maintain and prevent waste for the total
delivery system, not only for Company shareholders, but also for
private owners who had, under paragraph IV, entered into an
agreement with the City for maintenance, and for private owners
who had not entered into an agreement, as provided for in
paragraph L. This would be consistent with what appears to be the
overall intent of the two agreements:3 that the City have total
control and responsibility for the delivery system of culinary
water to all of the users in the Company area. The concern the
City has, as previously noted, is to assure correct water use
measurement and to prevent the waste of water through any defect
in the system prior to that water going through the meters, at
which point the owners would then be paying for the water and the
City would no longer have any concern. That the City intended to
take over total control is apparent from the conditions in the
1965 agreement in which it agreed to deliver the water, to meter
it, take over ownership of the meters, bill the users and collect
from them.4 In essence this was the City's business: to
provide, deliver and sell water to the users.
2. It is axiomatic that a contract should be interpreted so as to
harmonize all of its provisions. Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733,
735 (Utah 1980) (citing Vance v. Arnold, 114 Utah 463, 201 P.2d
475 (1949)). SeSi also Minshew v. Chevron Oil Co.. 575 P.2d 192,
194 (Utah 1978) (The established rules of contract interpretation
require consideration of each of its provisions in connection with
the others and, if possible, to give effect to all.)*
3. "We start our analysis with a basic tenet of contract law:
where two seemingly conflicting contract provisions reasonably can
be reconciled, a court is required to do so and to give both
effect. (citations omitted) This applies with equal force where
two documents are contemporaneous and related or when one
incorporates the terms of the other." Proyecfin de Venezuela v.
Banco Industrial de Venezuela, 760 F.2d 390, 395-96 (2d Cir.
1985).
I
4. "It is a fundamental rule that in the construction of
contracts the courts may look not only to the language employed,
but to the subject-matter and the surrounding circumstances
. . . . (citation omitted) To ascertain the intention, regard
must be had to the nature of the instrument itself, the condition
of the parties executing it, and the objects they had in view.
The words employed, if capable of more than one meaning, are to be
given that meaning which it is apparent the parties intended them
to have.- Kintner v. Harr, 146 Mont. 461, 408 P.2d 487, 494
(1965).
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Because we interpret the two contracts to be clear as to the
intent and meaning of the parties,
there is no need to address the
other arguments of respondent.5 The judgment of the trial court
is reversed. No costs awarded.

R. W. Garff, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Judith M. Billings, Judge

Norman H. Jackson, Judge
5. "[Tjhe trial court based its judgment mainly upon a finding
that the quoted contractual provisions were repugnant. . . .
Proceeding from that premise, the court applied various
secondary rules of contract interpretation to reach its ultimate
conclusion that the first quoted provisions must be disregarded
and that those quoted later should be given effect. Such an
approach is improper, however, because an effort must first be
made to reconcile the apparent repugnancies so that the entire
agreement can be given effect. It is only after such an effort
fails and the provisions are in irreconcilable conflict, that
the secondary rules of interpretation such as those favoring
specific provisions over general, first stated provisions over
later ones, and a construction against the scrivener are to be
applied.H (emphasis in original) Exxon Corp. v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 589 S.W.2d 473, 478 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).

860045-CA

6

